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MORE ABOUT OYSTERS THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNOW
By GARRETT POWER*
"I am reminded of the little girl's criticism of a book
her teacher had made her read about penguins: 'This book
told me more about penguins than I wanted to know.' "'
The American Eastern oyster has a sedentary sex life. In adult
form both male and female oysters are unable to move. They are physi-
cally attached to the ibottom or bed (rock, shell or other cultch). But
between May and October female oysters release eggs and male oysters
release sperm. Spawning occurs upon the chance encounter of egg
and sperm in the water over the bed. The resulting larva, after six or
seven days, acquires a shell (thereby becoming known as a spat) and
settles back to the bed where it attaches itself to the cultch. This proc-
ess is referred to as spatfall. The set or number of spat which attach
themselves to the cultch in a given area depends on the availability
of a clean, firm surface and varies according to current, temperature
and salinities.2
Maryland's Chesapeake Bay waters afford an almost perfect
environment for these biological processes. Although lacking a single
area with a high rate of spatfall (such as the James River in Vir-
ginia), setting is good in many places. Vast expanses of bottom are
covered with waters of hospitable temperatures and salinities. More-
over, the sheltered, less saline waters of the Bay afford relative
freedom from both predators (for example, starfish and oyster drills)
and the disease MSX that has substantially ruined oyster production
in Long Island Sound, Delaware Bay and some Virginia waters.'
Notwithstanding these natural advantages, Maryland oyster pro-
duction has suffered a dramatic decline. In 1880, the Maryland
fishery produced 71.9 million pounds of oysters; in 1962, it produced
8.1 million pounds.' In part, this decline can be attributed to biologi-
cal changes in the estuary. Pollution has reduced the availability of
oxygen; shoreline construction has resulted in erosion which has
silted over beds; fertilizers and municipal wastes have produced plant
growth which has displaced the food of oysters; and herbicides and
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pesticides have had a toxic effect on oysters.' But economics rather
than biology account for most of the decline in yield. The vast pre-
ponderance of Maryland oyster beds are treated as a commons, and
oysters as common property. In the absence of controls on exploita-
tion from some source, this treatment inevitably leads to depletion
of the oyster fishery.' This paper will examine the nature of economic
problems occasioned by treating oysters as common property and the
effectiveness of the response by the State's legal institutions.
I. THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
The development of Maryland's oyster industry provides a classic
example of the "tragedy of the commons." 7 When Maryland was
first settled, oysters were in surfeit. Seemingly inexhaustible, they
were treated as common property (like water and air) available to all
for the taking. This arrangement worked well for several centuries
until oystermen began to take more oysters than the fishery could nat-
urally replenish. At this point the inexorable decline began. Rational
oystermen realized that it was in their economic interest to increase
the catch so as to maximize their gain. Although the oystermen real-
ized that they were depleting the resource upon which their livelihood
depended, they had no incentive to reduce their catch or otherwise
cultivate the bed (and thereby sustain the yield) since there was no
guarantee that other oystermen would follow suit. Oysters were har-
vested to the point where the number of spawning oysters was so re-
duced that the reproductive capacity of the fishery was greatly
diminished. Shells were removed in such great number that oyster
beds were smothered by encroaching silt.'
Treatment of oysters as common property has also resulted in
application of excessive amounts of capital and labor to the fishery.
The absence of limitations on the number of operations attracts addi-
tional oystermen to the industry whenever there is any difference be-
tween revenue and costs. As a result, total revenue has been shared
by so many operators that no true profits remain to be divided - over-
all fleet costs just equal revenue. Accepting economic efficiency as a
goal, this amount of effort is excessive since a reduction in the size
of the oyster fleet would maximize the net economic revenue from the
industry (to be shared by the oystermen or appropriated by the public)
and at the same time permit those diverted from the oyster fishery to
produce other goods and services.'
5. Pollution has not only interfered with the physical yield of the fishery, but it
has also necessitated the official closing of oyster beds because of health hazards.
Section 228B of article 43 of the Annotated Code of Maryland authorizes the State
Board of Health to close oyster beds because of their proximity to points of sewage
outflow or because of a high bacteria count in surrounding waters. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 228B (1965). By 1968, 11,145 acres of natural oyster beds in the Baltimore
region were so closed. P. Farragut, A Reconnaissance Study of the Chesapeake Bay 46
(Regional Planning Council, Baltimore, Md. 1968).
6. See generally F. CHRISTY, JR. & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES 6-16 (1965).
7. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 172 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
8. See generally Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 117-19.





Maryland's legal institutions have not passively permitted the
oystermen to decimate the fishery while dissipating their profits through
competition. Several approaches have been taken: the State has itself
made significant efforts to restore the productivity of the common
property oyster fishery; the State has enacted regulations which both
minimize depletion and attempt -to protect the oystermen from the
ravages of competition; and the State has taken faltering steps towards
creation of a private property oyster fishery in which the decisions of
oystermen are likely to promote the realization of the maximum net
economic revenue from the fishery.
A. State Restoration
Maryland oyster production has increased from an all-time low
of 1,243,497 bushels during the 1962-63 season to a modern high in
excess of 3,000,000 bushels during 1966-67. Annual production is
expected to continue to exceed 3,000,000 bushels.'0 This upswing is
primarily a result of massive State efforts in planting shells and seed
oysters on public grounds. Since 1961, ancient deposits of buried
shells have been dredged up and replanted as oyster cultch. In addi-
tion, on beds where there is a relatively low natural setting rate, the
State has planted seed oysters." These efforts, while effective in
restoring some of the public oyster grounds, have incurred substantial
public cost. During the period from 1960 through 1965, the State
spent well in excess of five million dollars on these programs.' 2
Legislation enacted by the Maryland General Assembly in 1967'3
and 1968's was designed to pay such costs by earmarking various
State revenues for repletion of fishery resources. The 1967 legislation
created the Fishery Research and Development Fund and provided for
payment into it of various revenues derived from tidewater re-
sources. 5 In 1968, the General Assembly broadened the financial base
of the fund by promulgating a schedule increasing the oyster taxes
which are levied against oystermen according to the amount of their
take.'"
This change had the effect of increasing shellfish tax revenue
from $78,000 during the 1968 fiscal year to $690,000 during the 1969
fiscal year.' 7 These new laws have been billed as sufficient to place the
10. See 1969-70 MARYLAND MANUAL 168 (1970).
11. See J. Manning, Bay Fisheries Resources, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNOR'S
CONFERENCE ON CHESAPEAKE BAY 91, 96 (1968).
12. WYE INSTITUTE, A REPORT ON THE CHESAPEAKE BAY FISHERIES OF MARY-
LAND 60 (1966).
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 716 (Supp. 1969), amending MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, § 716 (1967).
14. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 711 (Supp. 1969), amending MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, § 711 (1967).
15. The Fund receives all moneys obtained from license fees taxes, fines, penalties
and forfeitures provided-for under the oyster code and all royalties paid to the State
for removal of oyster and clam shells from Maryland waters. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, § 716 (Supp. 1969).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art 66C, § 711 (Supp. 1969).
17. See '1969-70'MARYLAND MANUAL 817-18 (1970).
1970]
MARYLAND LAW REVIE[
public oyster fishery on a "self-sustaining, non-subsidized" basis.'8
Unfortunately, to date earmarked revenues have not been sufficient to
meet the costs. In fiscal 1969, payments into the fisheries fund totaled
$910,549 while expenditures for tidewater resource management (the
vast preponderance of which are for oyster repletion) totaled $1,-
432,679.19 The $522,130 deficit was made up out of general funds -
for fiscal 1970 the State budget estimated the deficit at $831,679.'
Moreover, although the State's repletion activities have increased the
physical output of the oyster fishery, they are not likely to change the
economic return per unit of input. Instead, .they will attract additional
oystermen and additional cost which will consume the increased rev-
enues."1 Hence, the State, in placing the oyster fishery on a "self-
sustaining" basis, has significantly subsidized the oyster industry
without improving the economic lot of the oysterman; and the oyster
fishery, while nominally a great State asset, diverts millions of dollars
away from other State activities.
B. State Regulation
The State has only recently become involved in management of
the oyster fishery through programs involving replanting of beds and
sowing of seed oysters. Traditionally, the State sought to "conserve"
the oyster fishery through regulations limiting the activity of private
oystermen. But, as has been generally observed, "a great deal (per-
haps the greater part) of what has been done in the name of 'conserva-
tion policy' turns out, upon subjection to economic analysis, to be
worthless, or worse .... "22 Most Maryland regulation of the oyster
fishery fits within this model: nominally justified in terms of conserva-
tion, but in effect protecting special interests and increasing the cost
of taking oysters without protecting either the capacity of the re-
source to reproduce itself or the return to individual oystermen.
1. Entry Restrictions
Maryland's oyster laws contain a series of provisions which re-
strict entry to the oyster fishery. In addition to various licensing re-
quirements,28 access is generally limited to Maryland residents, access
to "county waters" may be limited to county residents, and corpora-
tions are precluded from taking oysters. All of these restrictions can
be rationalized as "conservation" measures since limitation on the
number of economic units which participate in the taking tends to
minimize depletion. On realistic examination, however, even this
rationalization proves invalid since even after imposition of these
18. See J. Manning, supra note 11, at 97.
19. See THE MARYLAND STATE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,
1971, at 366 (Jan. 1970).
20. Id.
21. See F. CHRISTY, JR. & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OcEAN FISHERIES
15-16 (1965).
22. Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 110-11
(1958).
23. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 698(c), 703(a) (1967); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, §§ 698(b), 700(a), 703A(b) (Supp. 1969).
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restrictions the number of units permitted to take oysters is so large
that an excessive number take part and depletion occurs.2" In addi-
tion, as detailed below, these restrictions affirmatively interfere with
effective management and development of the fishery.
The most basic restriction on entry to Maryland's oyster beds is
a provision limiting access to residents. 25 This limitation is modified
by the Potomac River Compact of 1958 which provides that the
Potomac fishery shall be "common to and equally enjoyed by citizens
of Virginia and Maryland."2 Discrimination against non-residents is
understandable; Maryland's General Assembly cannot be expected to
voluntarily share the Bay's bounty. However, a broad statutory pro-
hibition of this sort interferes with efficient management. For ex-_
ample, Dr. J. L. McHugh, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Com-
mercial Fishery, has detailed mutually advantageous trade-offs which
are a present possibility between Maryland and Virginia:
Maryland's success in improving her oyster production
recently has come about through two cases [sic], a massive State
program to plant shell and living oysters on public grounds, and
relative freedom from the marine blights and pests that have
wrecked the oyster industries in . . . most parts of Virginia.
Maryland does not have a single large and reliable natural
seed oyster bed like the James River in Virginia . . . .Maryland
also has had a shortage of shell for planting back on oyster
grounds. Public policy and fishery laws of the two states effec-
24. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 109.
25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 698(c) (1967).
26. Potomac River Compact of 1958, art. III, § 4, codified in MD. ANN. CODE
art 66C, § 261A (1967).
This Compact is the product of an interesting chapter of history. ThePotomac serves as a boundary between Maryland and Virginia. The original grant
to Lord Baltimore made the "further bank" of the Potomac the southwest boundary
of Maryland. The grant of the northern neck of Virginia made by King James II
to Lord Culpeper likewise was bounded by the Potomac River and seemed to include
the river bed (i.e., "together with the said rivers themselves and all islands within
the outermost banks thereof"). Despite this ostensible conflict, Maryland's claim to
the bed of the Potomac has never been seriously controverted; but since colonial times,disputes have continuously arisen as to the rights of use and navigation. In 1785,Maryland and Virginia entered into a compact resolving some of these disputes.Virginia relinquished her right to charge tolls for Maryland ships passing through
the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay in return for Maryland's undertaking to permit
Virginians free access to the Potomac and Maryland portions of the Bay. In addition,
it was provided that citizens of both states were to have a common right of fishery
in the Potomac. See generally C. Everstein, The Compact of 1785, at 29-34 (Leg.
Council of Md. Research Rep. No. 26, 1946).
Subsequent adoption of the federal Constitution itade the free access pro-
visions of the Compact of 1785 obsolete, leaving the provisions relating to the Potomac
fishery as the only operative sections. The Compact provided for regulation of the
fishery through concurrent (Maryland and Virginia) legislation. Over the years
this rather cumbersome regulatory mechanism raised various legal problems. More
significantly, Maryland and Virginia oystermen and marine police engaged in various
skirmishes. There were charges and counter-charges that the marine police and courts
of the respective states were selectively enforcing various restrictions (primarily the
prohibition against dredging) only against citizens of the other state. In response to
these problems, Maryland and Virginia adopted and Congress ratified the present
Potomac River Fishery Compact in 1958.
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tively prevent maximum use of the Bay for growing oysters. If
these legal barriers did not exist the Bay could be managed as a
gigantic oyster farm, making best use of the characteristics of
each part of the environment to produce seed, to serve as growing
grounds, or as fattening or holding grounds.2 7
Exclusion of Virginians from Maryland oyster ground is, of course,
one of the legal barriers to the development of such an oyster farm.
Maryland oyster laws embrace another sort of institutionalized
parochialism: county residency is used as a criterion for limiting ac-
cess to the oyster fishery within "county waters."2 ' This limitation is
an old one, first appearing in Maryland law in 1829 when the Gen-
eral Assembly decreed that only "citizens of the counties bordering
on waters" could take oysters "within three hundred yards of low
water mark. '29 Not only is this limitation questionable in terms of
conventional notions of fairness,8" but it has also set the stage for the
development of fundamental problems of oyster management.
Because of the traditional use of county residency as a device for
limiting access, watermen have politically organized on a county-by-
county basis. The Maryland General Assembly has institutionalized
comity techniques through which local bills or local exemptory amend-
ments to general bills are passed at the request of county delegations."
County watermen's associations have prevailed upon their respective
county delegations to pass various laws applicable only to that county's
waters. Since eleven Maryland counties abut tidewaters which con-
tain substantial oyster grounds and since the main arm of the Chesa-
peake has been treated as being without the waters of any county, Mary-
land's oyster code is really a compilation of laws applying different
rules to twelve different geographical units.8 2
Some of the geographical distinctions found in these oyster laws
can be justified, or at least rationalized. Valid resource management
reasons exist for separate regulation of the oyster fishery in Wor-
cester County. Worcester County waters are not part of the Chesa-
peake Bay estuarine system but rather a part of the coastal Chinco-
teague and Assawoman Bays. Oysters found in these more saline
waters are known as "salt" oysters, are in greater demand for the "on
the half shell" market, and have a higher market price than oysters
from the less saline waters of Chesapeake Bay.8" But for the most
part, the myriad county-by-county variations found in the oyster
27. J. McHugh, supra note 3, at 152-53.
28. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, §§ 700, 702 (1967).
29. Ch. 87, § 6, [1829] Md. Laws.
30. See notes 34-48 infra and accompanying text.
31. See J. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MARYLAND 15-19
(1965).
32. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 696-710A (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,§§ 698(b), 699(b), 700(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (1), 701(a), 702(d), 703A,
706(d), 707(b), (d), (g), (j), 7 08(o), (u), (w), 710A (Supp. 1969).
33. See Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 102-05. While the laws relating
to the Worcester County fishery are not peculiar, the oyster fishery has in fact
developed in a much different manner. Through agreement (rather than legal pro-
cedures) oystermen have parceled out exclusive use rights among themselves and
developed "private" oyster farms. For the most part, they ignore any laws which
interfere with their operations. Id.
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laws have no rational justification but merely represent a disjointed
compilation of local laws. As such they prevent unified and uniform
management.
Moreover, the development of the notion of disparate "county
waters" for the eleven oyster counties has given rise to legalistic prob-
lems of definition. Terrestrial boundaries of counties are generally
surveyed, well-marked and therefore not difficult to ascertain. But
in Maryland, which is bisected by an estuary, the extent to which the
boundaries of a county embrace areas of tidewater becomes prob-
lematic. The common law response to the problem proved less than
adequate for Maryland. Common law presumed (in the absence of a
statutory provision to the contrary) that the boundaries of counties
on either side of a body of navigable water extended to the center."
While this approach might be more or less effective in dividing a
river between opposite riparian counties, it has little efficacy in parcel-
ing out a sprawling, many-fingered estuary between a number of
shoreline counties.
The Maryland legislature has responded to the problem in a piece-
meal fashion. The colonial statutes creating tidewater counties merely
described them as bounding on various rivers and creeks and the
Chesapeake Bay without parceling out portions of the tidewater in a
systematic fashion . 5 But in 1704, the colonial assembly explicitly
dealt with the problem with the following legislation:
AND, whereas there are several counties that are divided
by navigable rivers, and no rule yet made how far the jurisdic-
tion of each county shall extend on the river, BE IT THERE-
FORE ENACTED, by the authority aforesaid, That every county
lying on any navigable river in this province shall extend its
jurisdiction from the shore to the channel of such river that
divides the county, and be divided from the other county by the
channel of the said river; and that where any ship or vessel shall
ride at anchor in the channel of such river, process may be served
on board the said ship by the officer of either county that can
first serve it, but when moored by any hold on the land, shall
be supposed to lie in that county to whose shore she is fastened,
if moored.8"
This law is still in force, with only minor grammatical changes, in
article 75 of the Annotated Code of Maryland ;37 but it was apparently
read not to extend county jurisdiction into the main arm of the Bay
since in 1908 it was thought necessary to enact a companion statute
which applies more or less the same rule to all navigable waters of
the State."8 This latter statute also provided a mechanism for me-
34. 2 H. FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1482 (1904).
35. See, e.g., ch. 3, §§ 1-4, [1706] Md. Laws (defining boundaries for Talbot,
Queen Anne's, Kent and Cecil Counties).
36. Ch. 92, § 3, [1704] Md. Laws.
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 81 (1967).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 82 (1967) (originally enacted as ch. 487, § 1, [1908]
Md. Laws 223) : "The jurisdiction of every county bounded at any point by navigable
waters shall extend from the shore to the inside of the channel."
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morializing the boundaries it described by providing for the estab-
lishment of county maps. 9 To the extent that these statutes merely
authorize county sheriffs to serve process in a given expanse of water,
they have been replaced by a rule of procedure promulgated by the
Maryland Court of Appeals ;40 but, at least according to a Maryland
trial court, these statutes also define "county waters" for purposes of
determining the applicability of oyster laws.4 1
In addition, the Haman Law, enacted in 1906 in an effort to
liberalize procedures for creating private oyster leases, called for a
survey of submerged tidelands, primarily for the purpose of deter-
mining the location of natural oyster bars.42 However, since the law
drew certain distinctions between leasing "within the territorial limits
of any of the counties" and leasing "in any other place," it was also
incumbent on the surveyor to plot county lines.43 Accordingly, the
charts which were prepared between 1906 and 1912 established terri-
torial limits for counties. Under the original statute the surveyor
was given no directions as to how to delimit territorial boundaries.
But the 1945 recodification of the oyster laws ratified the territorial
limits that the surveyor had established by including them in the
statute's definitional sections, thereby creating another set of bound-
aries for the tidewater counties. 44 The county boundaries in the charts
established pursuant to article 66C are similar but not identical to
those established under article 75.45 Hence, in the application of the
oyster laws, there are two sets of county waters from which to choose.
The notion of county waters has also created another problem.
The oyster laws contain a variety of criminal penalties. Since thejurisdiction of trial courts generally extends only to crimes committed
within a particular county,46 the problem arises as to which court has
authority to try a person charged with a criminal violation on the
tidewaters. As early as 1809, the General Assembly provided a gen-
eral mechanism for establishing venue for crimes committed on Chesa-
peake Bay. This statute is presently codified in section 588 of article
27 and in pertinent part reads as follows:
Any person who shall commit any crime, offense or misdemeanor
upon the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, within the limits of this
State, and without the body of any county thereof . . . may be
indicted and tried in any court of this State having jurisdiction
of similar crimes, offenses and misdemeanors, of the county in
which he may be arrested, or into which he may first be brought. 47
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 83 (1967) (originally enacted as ch. 487, § 2, [1908]
Md. Laws 224).40. MD. R.P. 104(a). The sheriff may serve process wherever he finds the party,
whether in or out of the county of the court from which the process was issued.
41. State v. Thomas (Cir. Ct of Queen Anne's County, May 28, 1957).
42. Ch. 711, § 86, [1906] Md. Laws. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
43. Ch. 711, § 98, [19061 Md. Laws.
44. This definition is now found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 696(j), (1)(1967).
45. State v. Thomas (Cir. Ct. of Queen Anne's County, May 28, 1957).
46. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 30 (1966).
47. MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 588 (1967).
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But the appropriate venue in criminal cases involving violation
of the oyster laws remains confused as a result of a 1956 amendment
to this section. At its 1955 session the General Assembly passed a
law exempting persons violating the oyster and clam laws from the
application of what is now section 588 and providing instead: "If the
said violation occurred in any waters adjacent to and contiguous with
any tidewater county, the Court having jurisdiction in the county
where the violation occurred shall have jurisdiction thereby."4 It ap-
pears likely that this legislation was passed at the behest of watermen
(who are organized on a county-by-county basis) to statutorily guar-
antee a "home court" advantage. The Governor, however, vetoed the
bill. In his message explaining the veto, Governor McKeldin included
the following opinion of the Attorney General:
The worst feature of the Act is that it creates a vacuum, a
place where no court could have jurisdiction over an offender of
the conservation statutes. We refer to this sentence - "If the
said violation occurred in any waters adjacent to and contiguous
with any tidewater county, the courts having jurisdiction in the
county where the violation occurred shall have jurisdiction."
If a violation should occur in waters adjacent to a tidewater
county, where would such waters be? Adjacent is synonymous
with contiguous; both mean adjoining or neighboring. In other
words, the offense might occur in the neighboring waters, not in
a county, but in the Chesapeake Bay or other body of water out-
side the boundaries of any county. Therefore, since the violation
would not have occurred in any county .. .there would be seri-
ous question as to whether any court has jurisdiction. The stat-
ute, as it would be amended by Senate Bill No. 101, does not
simply say that if any violation occurs in the waters of any
county, the courts having jurisdiction of the county where the
offense occurs shall have jurisdiction.49
Despite this infirmity, the General Assembly overruled the veto at
the next legislative session and the bill became law."0 Hence, there
is a possibility that no court may have jurisdiction to try those
charged with violating oyster laws in "waters of the Chesapeake Bay."
Finally, another discriminatory limitation on entry is found in
Maryland's oyster laws - corporations are effectively precluded from
engaging in the business of taking oysters. Tonging licenses are only
available to natural persons,"' dredging licenses are only available to
48. [1955] Md. Laws 1276, 1277. The bill passed by the legislature was Senate
Bill No. 101, the quoted portion of which is contained in Governor McKeldin's veto
message of May 9, 1955. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ch. 13, [19561 Md. Laws 16. The act passed added an exception to section 675
of article 27 (presently section 588) which exempted section 665 of article 66C(presently section 717) from its provisions and added the above quoted language to
section 665. See text accompanying note 37 jupra.
51. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 700(a) (Supp. 1969).
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persons who are "bona fide" owners of a dredge boat and who take
an oath that "there is no lien on said boat held by a non-resident," '52
and corporations are expressly prohibited from leasing private oyster
grounds.13 Hence, the ruggedly individualistic oysterman is insulated
from corporate competition; but, since in our economy the corporation
is the favored device for assembling capital and management talent,
the State and oyster industry are deprived of investment and in-
novation.
2. Depletion Controls
Not surprisingly, when the yield of the oyster fishery began its
dramatic decline, the Maryland legislature responded with direct con-
trols on exploitations. As noted, these controls vary from the waters
of one county to the next. However, it is possible to extract from the
resulting morass certain types of restrictions which cut across county
lines. These controls take the form of gear restrictions, size limits,
and limited seasons. With various degrees of persuasiveness, these
controls can be justified as protecting the oyster fishery from physical
depletion.
Tongs (a pair of iron rakes with handles from twelve to twenty
feet long joined together like a forcep) have been used to gather
Maryland oysters since the mid-1600's.54 In the early 1800's, the
dredge (a scoop used to take oysters by dragging) was introduced
in the Bay by New Englanders.5 5 It was at first outlawed, nominally
on the grounds that the dredges dug too deeply into the bed and stirred
up bottom mud and were therefore injurious to the oyster beds, but
perhaps more realistically because the established tongers did not like
this new source of competition. But in 1865, dredging was legalized
in certain waters56 - not surprisingly the deeper waters of the Chesa-
peake Bay, which were unsuitable for tonging anyway. Over the
years dredgers have from time to time illegally invaded shallow water,
with warfare resulting ;57 but with multitudinous exceptions the princi-
ple of Chesapeake Bay for dredgers and county waters for tongers is
still found in the oyster laws today.5 8
The gear restriction with the most significant economic impact is
the prohibition against dredging for oysters under motor power.5 9
52. MD. ANN. CODE art 66C, § 702(b) (1967). It is relatively clear in the
context of section 702(b) that the term "person" is only intended to embrace natural
persons. Arguably though, the section might permit issuance of dredging licenses to
domestic corporations. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 696(m) (1967) ; cf. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 2(13) (1965). The administering agency, at least in recent years, has
not been faced with the problem since no corporations have applied. Telephone inter-
view with Harold A. Davis of the Fish and Wildlife Administration, September 1,
1970.
53. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 708(e) (1967).
54. M. BREWiNGTON, CHESAPEAKE BAY 171 (1956).
55. Id.
56. Ch. 181, § 1(2), [18651 Md. Laws 338.
57. See M. BREWINGTON, CHESAPEAKE BAY 173 (1956).
58. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 700(i), 702(b), (c), § 703(h) (1967).
59. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 702(k) (1967).
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The need for this restriction is dramatic - whereas tongers can take
between six and fifty bushels of oysters per day, a power dredge can
take 1400 bushels per hour. In the absence of this restriction, Mary-
land's public oyster beds would be harvested in a matter of days.60
Size limitations and attendant culling requirements also have a
significant effect on maintenance of the oyster fishery. Indiscriminate
removal of cultch was a major factor in the decline of the fishery. In
the 1800's, oyster shells were ground up for chicken feed or used in
building county roads. As a result, incursions of mud smothered what
had once been productive oyster grounds.6' The General Assembly
first responded to this problem in 1800 with a law which required that
all oysters be culled over their natural beds.62 In the intervening
ninety years various details have been added, but a successor is still in
effect.6" In its present form the law requires return to the bottom of
all old oyster shell and all oysters less than three inches in length,
thereby protecting the breeding stock of young oysters as well as the
oyster bed itself.
Finally, the oyster laws contain a variety of season limits most
of which revolve around the "R" rule - oysters can only be taken in
months with the letter "R" in their names. The tonging season is
from September 15 through March 31, although it is longer in certain
county waters and year round in Worcester County.64 The dredging
season is from November 1 through March 15.6" The choice of sea-
son may be biologically questionable as a sustained yield measure
since it permits taking in September, when oysters may still be
spawning.6
6
The effect of these controls on the rate of depletion is difficult
to appraise. But it appears clear that, as presently enforced, they are
not sufficient to sustain the physical yield of the fishery. This is well
illustrated by the steady decline in production of public oyster grounds
prior to the State's direct involvement in their restoration. Moreover,
these restrictions result in a substantial public cost. Each of them
reduces the efficiency of the oysterman: gear restrictions mandate
archaic methods of taking; size limitations require expenditure of
effort separating marketable from undersized oysters; and season
limitations require that equipment lay idle for part of the year. These
inefficiencies in turn bid up the unit cost of harvest and the price of
oysters. In addition, the State maintains an "Oyster Navy" of over
100 motor boats and one helicopter along with over 100 tidewater
policemen. Since a primary function of this fleet is the enforcement
of oyster regulations, a portion of the $1,343,510 expenditure of the
60. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 122-23.
61. In Somerset and Worcester Counties, the taking of oysters for certain pur-
poses was prohibited - for use as manure in Somerset and for making lime in Wor-
cester. But the shells of oysters taken for consumption were not returned to the beds.
Id. at 124.
62. Ch. 198, § 40, [18801 Md. Laws 322.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 699(a) (1967).
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 700(l) (Supp. 1969).
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 702(i) (1967).
66. See Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 123.
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Division of Law Enforcement of the Department of Natural Re-
sources must be attributed to such enforcement. 67
3. Consequences
Maryland's system of public oyster grounds has engendered a
variety of public controls which have been justified more or less on
the basis that they are necessary to protect these grounds from de-
pletion. These controls have failed, in and of themselves, to prevent
depletion - perhaps because of inherent inadequacies, perhaps because
of failures of enforcement.68 But these controls have had numerous
side effects: they discriminate, generally in favor of Maryland resi-
dents, more particularly in favor of certain county residents; they
interfere with the development of mutually advantageous, cooperative
arrangements between Maryland and Virginia; they mandate in-
efficiencies which increase the unit cost of harvesting oysters and fore-
close the possibility of technological innovations; and they require the
expenditure of substantial public funds for an "Oyster Navy" to enforce
them.
4. Private Oyster Grounds
Economic theory provides a panacea for the ills of Maryland's
oyster industry - the institution of exclusive use rights to oyster
grounds. Traditionally, legal institutions have treated natural re-
sources as common property only where there is either no govern-
mental body with effective territorial jurisdiction over their situs
(i.e., the high seas, ocean floor, arctic and antarctic regions or outer
space) or physical obstacles to the effective delineation and assertion
of private rights in them (i.e., air space, migratory fish and wild-
life). 69 The sedentary oyster, ensconced in the territorial waters of
Maryland, fits within neither of these categories. It is not difficult
to envision Maryland oyster grounds divided into private oyster farms
like those in Long Island Sound and the Virginia tidewater.
It is also not difficult to catalogue, with a view towards economic
efficiency, the advantages of private oyster grounds. Creation of ex-
clusive use rights (whether through leasing or outright grants) would
eliminate the necessity for legal restrictions on the methods and time
of harvesting. Since each oyster farmer would have an incentive to
67. See The Maryland State Budget for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1971,
at 371 (January 1970).
68. Oystermen have an established reputation as scofflaws. In 1887, Goode's
Fishery Industries of the United States described it as follows:
It is now rarely the case that a dredger can be found who will admit that he
believes there is anything wrong in disregarding the oyster laws and such a thing
as being disgraced among his fellow workmen by imprisonment for violation of
the laws is totally unknown. In the above facts will be found sufficient reasons
why it has been impossible for the oyster police, since its first organization, to
enforce the laws. Seven hundred well-manned, fast sailing boats, scattered over
such a large area as the Chesapeake Bay, are rather difficult to watch, and
especially at night.Quoted in R. BURGESS, THIS WAS CHESAPEAKE BAY 136-39 (1963).




sustain the yield of his oyster grounds, :the State would not need to
protect these grounds from exploitation. Freedom from existing legal
restraints would permit the oyster farmer to adopt the technology
most suitable to maximizing his economic return (among the changes
would certainly be the extensive use of power dredges). Each farmer
would be able to adjust his output to take advantage of seasonal price
variations and to determine the optimal size at which to market
oysters according to market conditions. Private ownership of oyster
grounds would, of course, eliminate the present congestion over prime
oyster beds. Furthermore, State expenditures for the oyster industry
could be reduced; and revenues from the industry could be expected
to increase. Expenditures could be reduced since each oyster farmer
would assume the financial responsibility of cultivating his beds leav-
ing the State only with responsibility for policing and administration.
Assuming open market conditions, values would develop for oyster
grounds; and the State could be expected to charge private holders an
acreage tax or lease fee fairly reflective of these values.7"
Maryland has had long, albeit frustating, experience with the
development of such private oyster grounds. In 1830, the Maryland
General Assembly first provided a method through which individuals
could acquire certain exclusive property rights in submerged tide-
lands. 7' Maryland citizens were given authority to appropriate and
exclusively use an area for the purpose of "depositing, bedding or
sowing any oysters, or other shell fish."7" Riparian proprietors were
given first choice in staking out a claim adjacent to their land, and
county citizens were given exclusive rights to beds within county
waters.7" Initially, the law only allowed appropriation of one acre
on the Eastern Shore ;74 but it was extended to the Western Shore in
183375 and amended to allow lots of up to five acres in size in 1865.78
This law was tinkered with from time to time but remained in
effect in much the same form until 1867. In Phipps v. State,77 the
constitutionality of the law was questioned on the ground that it con-
ferred special privileges inconsistent with the common right of free
fishery in state waters. The Maryland Court of Appeals apparently
assumed a constitutional right to a common fishery but went on to
find that the statute did not violate it. In the following passage the
court rather cryptically explained its reasoning:
As we construe it, this privilege subtracts nothing from the
common right of fishery, nor can it be said to operate as a grant
of several rights from the common right, residing in the body of
the people. The natural beds of deposits of the oyster do not ex-
70. See generally Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 170-73.
71. Ch. 87, [1829] Md. Laws.
72. Id. at § 1.
73. Id. at §§ 2, 6.
74. Id. at § 4.
75. Ch. 265, § 1, [1832] Md. Laws.
76. Ch. 181, § 1(22), [1865] Md. Laws 343.
77. 22 Md. 380 (1864).
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tend to all the waters of the State, and at most, the argument
that the common right to fish for and take them is impaired by
the artificial deposits here authorized, would hold good only on
proof that a natural bed or deposit is appropriated to the artificial
use. It is settled that the lands of the State covered by navigable
water, may be granted, subject to the public right of navigation
and fishery; and independent of the question, as to the power of
the Legislature to restrict those rights by grants in severalty,
it is clear that they may be aided by grants, conferring particular
privileges. The power of the Legislature to authorize the erection
of wharves, and the reclamation of land from the water, for the
purpose of encouraging navigation and commerce, has never been
questioned, notwithstanding the effect has been to confer privi-
leges and advantages wholly private and exclusive in their char-
acter. And there appears to be no substantial reason why it may
not in like manner, grant privileges affording particular and ex-
clusive benefits, for the purpose of increasing generally the prod-
uct and value of the common right of fishery. The tendency of
the privilege, here conferred is undoubtedly in that direction. It
affords the citizen enjoying the common right, the means of pre-
serving, and increasing in value the fruits of his labor, - a result
substantially enhancing the worth of the right enjoyed, and con-
tributing also to the general comfort of the people and prosperity
of the State. It is not necessary to decide, in this case the very
important and perhaps delicate question, as to the power of the
Legislature to grant several or exclusive rights of fishery in
navigable waters, and we forbear the expression of any opinion
upon it. It is enough to say that the grant here objected to, does
not involve that question."
Presumably in response to these equivocations as to the constitu-
tionality of private oyster privileges, the Maryland General Assembly
added a proviso to the statute in 1867. 79 It stated that "no natural
bar or bed of oysters shall be located or appropriated.""0 This im-
provisation in turn introduced the new problem of making a distinc-
tion between "barren" beds (upon which individuals could acquire
exclusive oyster rights) and "natural" beds (upon which individuals
could not). In 1881, Judge Goldsborough of the Circuit Court of
Dorchester County made the first effort to strike such a distinction
with the following statement:
Land cannot be said to be a natural oyster bar or bed merely
because oysters are scattered here and there upon it, and because,
if planted they will readily live and thrive there; but whenever
the natural growth is so thick and abundant that the public
resort to it for livelihood, it is a natural oyster bar or bed, and
78. Id. at 389-90.




comes within the above quoted restriction in the law, and can
not be located or appropriated by an individual.8 '
The so-called "Goldsborough rule" was never tested in the Maryland
Court of Appeals because that court subsequently ruled that no appeal
lay from the determination of a trial court on the subject,82 but the
substance of the rule has been afloat in the brine of Maryland juris-
prudence ever since.
By the early twentieth century the catch of oysters had declined
drastically from the historic highs of the 1880's. As a response B.
Howard Haman, a Baltimore lawyer, advocated a new system for
more extensive cultivation of barren bottoms. The bill he drafted
was enacted in 1906.83 The law created the Board of Shell Fish Com-
missioners84 and directed it to lease barren bottom to Maryland resi-
dents for the purpose of oyster culture. 85  Leases were to be for
twenty years, and a rent schedule was included in the statute.86 The
act directed that a survey be made of the "natural oyster beds, bars
and rocks" and that they be marked by State buoys and excluded
from the operation of the leasing arrangement.8 7 Following adoption
of the Haman Act, there coexisted a profusion of methods through
which Maryland residents could acquire private oyster rights. In
addition to leases under the Haman Act, it was still possible to have
riparian rights or leasehold or freehold interests under the original
1829 legislation and its successors.8 " This mixed marriage was per-
mitted to continue until the oyster laws were recodified in 19458" so
as to substantially abolish riparian rights, leaving leasing as the only
statutorily mandated mechanism for private oyster culture."
The Haman Act failed in its intended purpose. Just as the home-
steader on Western lands met with opposition from cattlemen who
were accustomed to open range, the oyster farmer was met with op-
position from oystermen accustomed to an open fishery. These oyster-
men have effectively used legal institutions to prevent development
of a private oyster fishery.
The first attack on the private oyster fishery occurred in 1914.
From 1906 through 1912, Charles Yates conducted the survey called
for by the Haman Act." The so-called Yates Survey classified 216
81. Winder v. Moore (Cir. Ct. of Dorchester County, 1881), as quoted in
Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Catlin, 196 Md. 530, 533 (1950).
82. Jackson v. Bennett, 80 Md. 76 (1894). The judgment of the trial court was
not appealable because, when a court exercises "a special jurisdiction conferred by
statute," the judgment is considered final unless the statute provides appeal. Id. at 77.
83. Ch. 711, [1906] Md. Laws 1182.
84. Id. at § 1(84), at 1183.
85. Id. at § 1(98), at 1188.
86. Id.
87. Id. at § 1(86), at 1184.
88. See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text.
89. Ch. 929, [1945] Md. Laws 1402.
90. Id. at § 2(12), at 1425. Existing law continues to recognize a riparian prefer-
ence in any "creek, cover or inlet not exceeding one hundred yards at low water in
breadth at its mouth." MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 708(aa) (1967).
91. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
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thousand acres as natural oyster bars, forty-four thousand acres for
crabbing and clams, and the balance as barren.9 2 The Haman Act
itself contained no definition of natural oyster bars, and many oyster-
men felt that not all such bars had been included. They convinced
the Maryland General Assembly to amend the Haman Act to provide
for the resurvey of disputed bottom 93 and to elevate the Goldsborough
rule to statutory status with the following language: "The term
'natural beds or bars' whenever used in this Act shall hereafter be
construed to mean and include all oyster beds and bars under any of
the waters of this State whereon the natural growth of oysters is of
such abundance that the public have successfully resorted to such beds
or bars for a livelihood . . . within five years. 94
Pursuant to this amendment, 54,000 acres were reclassified from
barren bottom to natural oyster bar and thereby excluded from the
leasing provisions. 5 Private oyster lessees attacked the constitutional-
ity of this amendment on the ground that it created procedures which
could be used to impair contractual rights under existing leases, but
the Maryland Court of Appeals made short shrift of this argument
by pointing out that the statute guaranteed a lessee compensation if
his leasehold was so taken.96
The procedures created by the 1914 legislation have effectively
hamstrung the granting of oyster leases. This is best exemplified by
the fact that between 1914 and 1963 the acreage of "natural oyster
bars" increased from 270,000 to 285,000. This increase does not
represent a real increase in productive areas but rather is a by-product
of unsuccessful efforts to acquire leases. Under the procedures exist-
ing since 1914, a lease application can be challenged in court. If the
final decision is that the area sought is a natural oyster bar, the ap-
plication is denied; and the area is officially reclassified on the oyster
charts.' 8 In practice almost any protest has served to frustrate a lease
application, and the net addition of 15,000 acres is a result of re-
classifications following such rejections.99
Public oystermen have, moreover, effectively solidified these gains
with legislation. In 1945, they argued before the Court of Appeals
92. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 89.
93. Ch. 265, § 2(89), [1914] Md. Laws 381.
94. Id. at §2(83), at 379.
95. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 89-90.
96. See Cox v. Revelle, 125 Md. 579, 586 (1915) ; Board of Shell Fish Comm'rs
v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630 (1915). The Cox decision determined that the amendment
did not contravene article III, section 40 of the Maryland Constitution (prohibiting
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation) nor was it
in conflict with article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution (prohibiting
state legislation impairing the obligation of contracts).
97. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 93.
98. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 708(k) (1967) (originally enacted as ch. 265,
§ 2(94-B), [1914] Md. Laws 387.
99. Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 93-96. But cf. Department of Tide-
water Fisheries v. Catlin, 196 Md. 530 (1950), where the Maryland Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court judgment that the area in question was a natural oyster bar
because there was no evidence - other than the testimony of oystermen that they had




that, once bottom land was classified as a natural bed, it was always
a natural bed, even if the oyster supply was subsequently diminished
so that it was no longer productive.' The court disagreed, ruling
that a lease application could be properly entertained for any bottom
(regardless of how designated on existing charts) and that it was
then incumbent on the Department of Tidewater Fisheries to deter-
mine whether the bottom in question was in fact a natural bar.'
Shortly after this decision, the General Assembly amended the law
so that the Department could only reclassify submerged areas from
natural oyster bed to barren bottom through a cumbersome procedure
including public notice, hearing, and a jury trial if anyone disagrees
with the Department's decision.' 2 Subsequent legislation assured
that the above procedure is the only method to change bottom classi-
fications by divesting the Department of authority to change natural
bars to barren bottom as part of an overall resurvey.'0 3
Opposition to private oyster leases continues unabated. During
the 1950's, oystermen in Dorchester and Somerset Counties struck
a blow for a public oyster culture by having the General Assembly
prohibit the issuance of oyster leases in those counties altogether.0 4
Furthermore, the opposition to private leasing has a new impetus.
Since 1945, natural clam and crab beds have been explicitly exempted
from leasing.'0 5 In the early 1950's, Fletcher Hanks of Easton, Mary-
land, developed a hydraulic clam rig which made the taking of soft-
shelled clams efficient. The result has been a marriage of convenience
between strange bedfellows. Clammers and public oystermen are nat-
ural rivals since they compete for much of the same bottom, but they
have a common interest in preventing the development of an expansive
private oyster culture. Hence clammers have joined in the fight
against private leasing and, according to one authority, had managed
to become the primary force behind such opposition by 1964.10'
Even if an oysterman is able to acquire a lease, he still faces
substantial problems. He is limited to relatively small acreage; the
bed presumably will be of marginal quality; and seed oysters are diffi-
cult to grow and hard to obtain from public sources.1 0 7 In addition,
a lessee's operation can be made subject to various local laws which,
at least in economic theory, have no reasonable application. As initially
enacted, the Haman Act provided that the holders of oyster land
could take oysters "in any manner and at such times as may be de-
100. Popham v. Conservation Comm'n, 186 Md. 62, 67-68 (1946).
101. Id. at 71-74.
102. Ch. 725, [1947] Md. Laws 1775 [now MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 708(d)
(1967)].
103. Ch. 638, [1963] Md. Laws 1373 [now MD. ANN. CODE art 66C, § 707(i)(1967)].
104. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 709 (Somerset County), § 710 (Dorchester
County) (1967).
105. Ch. 929, § 2(12), [1945] Md. Laws 1425 [now MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,§ 708(b) (1967)1.
106. See Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 91-93; cf. Smack v. Jackson,
238 Md. 35 (1965), where a clammer successfully contested the issuance of a lease
for oyster cultivation, contending the area was a natural clam bar.
107. See Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 97-98.
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sired."' 08  This provision recognized that, since strictures on the
methods and time of taking are primarily designed to sustain the
yield, -they need not be applied to private oyster beds where there is a
built-in economic incentive to accomplish this goal. A provision au-
thorizing the removal in any manner of oysters planted on private leases
is still nominally in effect, but over the years almost all of the counties
with oyster grounds have exempted themselves from application of
the general rule and substituted a requirement that only the relatively
inefficient tongs or patent tongs be employed."0 9
In short, it appears that Maryland's private oyster fishery has
proved a political failure. This failure can be blamed on the respon-
siveness of the State's administration and General Assembly to the
special pleas of traditional watermen. Development of political sup-
port for a private property oyster industry appears prerequisite to
significant change.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CATHARSIS
Commentators have been pessimistic about the prospects for ex-
tensive reform of the oyster laws." 0 Oystermen, through their county
organizations, have traditionally held great sway over the General
Assembly and have used it to perpetuate the status quo. The success
of the watermen's lobbying efforts was once explained by the exces-
sive representation in the Assembly of the oyster counties; but this
success has survived reapportionment, perhaps through organization,
perhaps through inertia.
Despite the continued political power of oystermen, it is sub-
mitted that reform can be presently accomplished. Discriminations,
generally violative of the United States Constitution, permeate Mary-
land's existing oyster laws. These discriminations - the limitations
on entry which exclude non-residents and corporations from the oyster
fishery, and which exclude county non-residents from certain portions
of the oyster fishery - are impermissible, and, moreover, are so per-
vasive that they cannot be effectively extricated from the body of the
laws. Hence a successful judicial attack would be so cathartic that
reform would then become politically feasible.
The basic restriction on entry excludes citizens of other states
from Maryland's oyster fishery."' This disparate treatment of citi-
zens and non-citizens is constitutionally infirm since exclusion of
108. Ch. 711, § 1(112), [1906] Md. Laws 1194.
109. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 708(u) (Supp. 1969). The question has also
arisen as to the application of the State's cull laws (which require the throwing back
of undersized oysters) to private oyster growers. The Maryland Court of Appeals
at first found the cull laws applicable to private oyster farms, Windsor v. State, 103
Md. 611, 618 (1906), but subsequently reversed itself in Department of Tidewater
Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603 (1953), on the basis of an elaborate exercise in
statutory construction and the following policy grounds: "It may . . . be observed
that if private planters were compelled to put the shells back in areas where they
would not catch spat, they would not have shells for areas where they would catch
spat, thus frustrating the purpose of the law intended to be encouraged." Id.
110. See Christy, The Maryland Oyster Industry 188-89; WYE INSTITUTE, A
REPORT ON THE CHESAPEAKE BAY FISHERIES OF MARYLAND 7-10 (1966). But see
J. McHugh, supra note 3, at 153.
111. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 698(c) (1967).
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non-citizens flies squarely in the teeth of article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution, which provides: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States."" 2
The very purpose of this clause was to forge a single nation;118
doing business was one privilege sought to be made reciprocal from
state to state." 4 Therefore, non-citizenship cannot be used as a basis
for exclusion. For this reason, the Supreme Court in Toomer v.
Witsell" ' found a South Carolina statute which imposed an ex-
orbitant shrimp boat license fee on non-residents unconstitutional." 6
Tt is possible to argue that, since both Maryland citizens and non-
citizens are excluded, the provisions preserving county waters for
county residents do not violate the privileges and immunities clause.
This argument is both logically and constitutionally unsound. It is
not logical to uphold a state's exclusion of non-citizens from the
oyster fishery simply because the state also prohibits its citizens from
fishing for oysters outside of their respective counties; such a prac-
tice still results in the total exclusion of non-citizens from the fishery.
Constitutionally, such treatment of non-citizens is supported by no
authority. Those few cases which deal with this type of exclusion
in the area of natural resources do so on principles of "state owner-
ship." The state ownership theory, as hereinafter noted, is of doubt-
ful validity today." 7 As for the exclusion of corporations from the
fishery, since corporations are not "citizens," they lack the requisite
status to come within the clause's protection." 8
Both provisions are suspect under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, which provides: "nor shall any State . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.""' 9 The scope of the equal protection clause is broader than that
of the privileges and immunities clause in that it requires a reasonable
justification for any legislative classification rather than mere uni-
form treatment of state citizens and non-citizens and in that it pro-
tects "persons" regardless of whether they are "citizens."
The legislative classification which excludes all but county resi-
dents from county waters has some justification as a "conservation"
measure. As has been observed, it is arguable that any restriction on
112. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
113. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). "The primary purpose of this
clause . . . was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign
States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Id. at 395.
114. See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870). In Ward the Court
held unconstitutional a Maryland statute which imposed a license fee on non-resident
traders that was much greater than the license fee for Maryland residents.
115. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
116. Id. at 395-99. The fees were $25 per boat for residents, $150 per boat for non-
residents who had one or more boats licensed in the state during each of the past three
years, and $2500 per boat for all other non-residents. Id. at 390 n.11.
117. See notes 140-53 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the "state
ownership" theory).
118. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) ; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs,
172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I
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the number of economic units which participate in the taking tends
to retard depletion. But such a justification is not enough. A county
non-resident represents no peculiar threat to the fishery but merely
the same threat as represented by a county resident. Hence there is
no reasonable relationship between non-residents as a class and the
danger to be avoided - depletion of a common property resource.
The Supreme Court explicitly used this analysis in applying the privi-
leges and immunities clause in Toomer v. Witsell"0 and implicitly
used it in finding a California statute which precluded aliens from
obtaining commercial fishing licenses unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause.' 2 '
More recently, a three-judge federal district court enjoined, as a
denial of equal protection, enforcement of an Alaska statute which,
through a licensing procedure, effectively excluded non-residents (and
other newcomers) from the salmon fishery.'2 2  The court said, "Al-
though a state may enact fishing regulations in the legitimate interests
of conservation and safety, it may not, to achieve those ends, employ
arbitrary and irrational means which create or protect local, monopo-
listic interests."'2 3 As an alternative ground for its decision, the court
found that the law also violated a provision of the Alaska Constitu-
tion. 4 The case was appealed, and during the 1969 term the United
States Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in not
abstaining since an Alaska court's evaluation of validity of the
statute under state law might obviate any need to consider its validity
under the United States Constitution.' 5 Despite this judicial run-
around, the proposition of the district court (i.e., that restrictions on
entry nominally designed to conserve the fishery, but in fact designed
to protect local, monopolistic interest, deny equal protection) remains
unchallenged. The Maryland system of restricting entry to county
waters to county oystermen is an effort to do exactly this and there-
fnre violates the equal protection clause. It is significant that the At-
torney General of Maryland has so ruled.'
120. 334 U.S. 385, 396-98 (1948).
121. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1948).
122. Bozanich v. Reetz, 297 F. Supp. 300 (D. Alas. 1969).
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id. at 306. The statute was held to have violated article VIII, sections 3 and
15 of the Alaska Constitution:
3. Common Use. Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife,
and waters are reserved to the people for common use.
15. No Exclusive Right of Fishery. No exclusive right or special privi-
lege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters
of the State.
125. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
126. The opinion of the Office of the Attorney General is contained in the May 4,
1965, gubernatorial veto message from Governor Tawes to Speaker of the House
Marvin Mandel. In pertinent part, it reads as follows:
The Attorney General's Office feels that this bill is unconstitutional because it
permits Worcester or Somerset County residents to take crabs by means of crab
pots from the waters of respective counties, but prohibits other Maryland residents
from taking crabs from such waters by means of crab pots. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws renders invalid statutes which effect an
unlawful discrimination in favor of the inhabitants of a political subdivision or
county as against other residents of the State.
[19651 Md. Laws 1686.
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A syllogistic paradigm can be created in support of the provisions
excluding corporations from the oyster fishery. The Supreme Court
has found, despite vigorous dissents by Justices Black and Douglas,
that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the equal pro-
tection clause. 127  But the Court has said that "[a] classification
having some reasonable bases does not offend against that clause
merely . ..because in practice it results in some inequality."' 28 And
it is perhaps arguable that, since in an economic system corporations
are repositories of greater amounts of capital and managerial talent,
they represent a greater threat to depletion of the fishery than do in-
dividual takers and that, therefore, there is a reasonable basis for
their exclusion.'2 9 This argument is analytically untenable since it
is not the mere size or wealth of the particular economic unit engaged
in oyster fishing which has caused depletion of the fishery, but is,
rather, the peculiar practices of the fishery itself. Regulation which
would control those practices in such a way that it would insure the
replenishment of the fishery would not require the exclusion of cor-
porations, or of any other type of economic unit, from the fishery;
all participants would be subject to the remedial legislation. Thus
the present prohibition of corporations from engaging in oyster fish-
ing is not necessary to a termination of depletion. Moreover, it is
uncertain that a discrimination against individuals because of their
efficiency is "reasonable" enough to avoid being violative of the equal
protection clause. And factually, this strawman falls when it is con-
sidered that, even if corporations are excluded, the number of eco-
nomic units permitted to take oysters is so large that depletion will
nevertheless continue unabated.
Those given to paradox might, moreover, point out that the
reason given for holding the exclusion of corporations constitutional
under the equal protection clause may be used to find this provision
unconstitutional under the commerce clause."' Although in form
the commerce clause is merely an allocation of power to Congress
(i.e., "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce...
among the several States . . ."), it has been judicially convoluted
and used to strike down laws which burden commerce. It can cer-
tainly be argued that a state law which discriminates against cor-
porations because of their economic efficiency creates such a burden.
The Supreme Court, however, has had difficulty in formulating
a litmus test to be used in determining whether a state's commercial
127. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
128. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
129. Cf. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611
(1965), where the Court in dicta noted with approval a Colorado decision that states
have the authority to deny corporations the right to practice dentistry, insisting upon
the personal obligations of individuals. Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 90
Colo. 193, 8 P.2d 699, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 563 (1932). Of course, the basis for the
discrimination against corporations in Miller - that a dentist practicing as an employee
of a corporation would not feel as personally obligated to his patients as one who
practices as an individual - does not support the discrimination against corporations
contained in the oyster laws, where the existence or non-existence of some feeling
of personal involvement on the part of the oysterman is irrelevant to the questions
involved in retarding the depletion of oysters.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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regulations are unconstitutionally burdensome. Mr. Chief Justice
Stone attempted to do so in the following passage:
Although the commerce clause conferred on the national gov-
ernment power to regulate commerce, its possession of the power
does not exclude all state power of regulation. Ever since Will-
son v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., and Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, it has been recognized that, in the absence of conflict-
ing legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the
state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even,
to some extent, regulate it. Thus the states may regulate matters
which, because of their number and diversity, may never be ade-
quately dealt with by Congress. When the regulation of matters
of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact
on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its
operation, and the consequent incentive to deal with them nation-
ally is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within
state authority.' 3'
But Chief Justice Stone also recognized the inadequacy of these princi-
ples and went on to say:
In the application of these principles some enactments may be
found to be plainly within and others plainly without state power.
But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases, in
which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regula-
tion of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims
of state and national power is to be attained only by some ap-
praisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state
and national interests involved.' 3 2
A series of cases have sought such a reconciliation with respect to
wildlife. The Supreme Court in 1855 upheld a Maryland statute
which regulated the gear to be used in the taking of oysters, 13 in
1891 upheld a Massachusetts statute which regulated the taking of
menhaden in Buzzard's Bay, 34 in 1896 upheld a Connecticut statute
which prohibited the shipment of certain game birds without the
state, l"5 and in 1924 upheld a Louisiana statute which imposed a tax
on all skins and hides taken within the state including those shipped
out of state for manufacture.'36 But in two 1928 decisions, the
Supreme Court found Louisiana legislation, nominally dealing with
processing of shrimp and oysters but covertly designed to force can-
131. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1945) (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 768-69.
133. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
134. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
135. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
136. Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924). All shipments




ning industries located in Mississippi to move to Louisiana, a viola-
tion of the commerce clause. 137 Likewise, in Toomer v. Witsell, de-
cided in 1948, the Court found a South Carolina statute requiring
shrimp boats to dock at South Carolina ports before transporting
their catch to another state to be an unconstitutional burden on
commerce.1
38
From these cases, it does not appear that the Court has been in-
clined toward striking regulations as being violative of the commerce
clause merely because they impose inefficient, artificial and rigid eco-
nomic patterns on the fishery. If the Court were so inclined, not only
the provisions excluding corporations but many of the gear restric-
tions and size and season limitations found in Maryland's oyster laws
would be constitutionally suspect. Instead, the Supreme Court has
used the commerce clause to strike wildlife regulations designed to
discriminate in favor of the parochial economic interests of the indus-
tries and people of the particular state.'3 9 Hence, the restrictions on
entry precluding non-residents from the oyster fishery are also sus-
pect under the commerce clause.
Notwithstanding all of the above, there is a doctrine which could
be used to salvage Maryland's oyster laws. In the 1870's, a citizen
of Maryland was convicted of violating a Virginia law which made
it a crime for citizens of other states to plant or take oysters in Vir-
ginia waters. The Marylander contended that his conviction was in
violation of the privileges and immunities clause, but in McCready v.
Virginia.4 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and held that
the right of Virginia citizens to plant and take oysters was not merely
a privilege of citizenship but a prerogative of their collective owner-
ship of the oysters as well. The Court explained the significance of
this collective ownership with the following analogy:
The planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned in
common by the people of the State is not different in principle
from that of planting corn upon dry land held in the same way.
Both are for the purposes of cultivation and profit; and if the
State, in the regulation of its public domain, can grant to its own
citizens the exclusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why it
may not do the same thing in respect to such as are covered by
water. And as all concede that a State may grant to one of its
citizens the exclusive use of a part of the common property, the
conclusion would seem to follow, that it might by appropriate
legislation confine the use of the whole to its own people alone. 4 1
137. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) ; Johnson v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928). The shrimp legislation considered in Foster-Fountain
made it unlawful to ship without the state any shrimp from which the heads and
hulls had not been removed. The oyster legislation considered in Johnson contained
similar provisions.
138. 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948).
139. The legislation challenged in the Foster-Fountain and Johnson decisions
favored Louisiana processors. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
140. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
141. Id. at 396.
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State "ownership" has also been used to rationalize away other con-
stitutional problems. In a 1914 decision, Patsone v. Pennsylvania,1 2
Mr. Justice Holmes held that state ownership justified a prohibition
against taking of wildlife by aliens, the equal protection clause not-
withstanding. Likewise, it has been used to insulate state wildlife
regulations from the strictures of the commerce clause. Geer v. Con-
necticut,4 decided in 1896, explained this exception as follows:
The power of the State to control the killing of and ownership
in game being admitted, the commerce in game, which the state
law permitted, was necessarily only internal commerce, since
the restriction that it should not become the subject of external
commerce went along with the grant and was a part of it. All
ownership in game killed within the State came under this con-
dition, which the State had lawful authority to impose, and no
contracts made in relation to such property were exempt from
the law of the State consenting that such contracts be made,
provided only they were confined to internal and did not extend
to external commerce.14 4
More recent decisions, however, cast serious doubt on the efficacy
of the notion that Maryland's ownership of oysters and oyster beds
saves its oyster laws from constitutional attack. In Toonier v. Wit-
sell, 45 the previously discussed South Carolina shrimp case, the Court
rejected the notion that South Carolina's ownership of shrimp in its
marginal waters saved its laws from attack under the privileges and
immunities and commerce clauses. The Court said, "The whole
ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to the people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an im-
portant resource."' 4' Likewise, in the companion case of Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Commission,4' applying the equal protection clause,
the Court said, "[W]e think that 'ownership' is inadequate to justify
California in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful residents of
the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean off its shores
while permitting all others to do so."'""
Although the Supreme Court has verbally minimized the sig-
nificance of state ownership of natural resources, it has never formally
overruled McCready v. Virginia and its postcursors. Instead, in
Toomer the Court explicitly distinguished McCready. It pointed out
two factual distinctions:
First, the McCready case related to fish which would remain
in Virginia until removed by man. The present case, on the other
142. 232 U.S. 138 (1914). But see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)(opinion of Holmes, J.) : "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed."
143. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
144. Id. at 532.
145. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
146. Id. at 402.
147. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
148. Id. at 421.
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hand, deals with free-swimming fish which migrate through the
waters of several states and are off the coast of South Carolina
only temporarily. Secondly, the McCready case involved regula-
tion of fishing in inland waters, whereas the statute now ques-
tioned is directed at regulation of shrimping in the marginal sea.14
Despite this precedential deference, it is submitted that McCready is
functionally dead. Its doctrine has lain dormant for fifty years; its
distinguishment in Toomer seems legally and common-sensically in-
valid.
Moreover, in many respects this use of ownership to insulate
state regulations from constitutional attack is but another way of
verbalizing the now discredited "privilege not a right" distinction.
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will no longer countenance
the imposition of conditions or qualifications upon governmental privi-
leges if they tend to inhibit constitutionally protected activities.'5
An example of an effort to impose such a condition can be found in
the California case of Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dis-
trict.'5' In Danskin, the Supreme Court of California held that the
use of a school auditorium could not be denied to an individual be-
cause he refused to take a loyalty oath. Speaking for the court, Mr.
Justice Traynor said, "A state is without power to impose an un-
constitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege even
though the privilege is the use of state property."'" 2
Finally, at the 1969 term the Supreme Court indicated a renewed
willingness to strike down discrimination against non-residents. In
Shapiro v. Thompson,5 3 the Court held unconstitutional as a denial
of equal protection Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Pennsyl-
vania statutes which denied welfare assistance to people who had not
resided within the District of Columbia or the state for at least one
year. A holding which precludes a state from discriminating in the
application of its own funds which are certainly as much the property
of the state as were Virginia's oysters, goes far toward dispelling the
notion that state ownership can function as an excuse for invidious
discrimination. Based upon all of the foregoing, it appears that
McCready is a constitutional dodo.
IV. REFORM
Legally imposed cultural deprivations preclude development of
the full oyster-producing potential of the Maryland fishery. These
149. 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948).
150. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 n.6 (1962). See Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 731, 739-46 (1964).
151. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
152. 171 P.2d at 891.
153. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro can also be regarded as a direct attack on
the constitutionality of Maryland oyster laws. In broadest terms, Shapiro was bot-
tomed on the concept of a right to interstate travel. This right, coupled with the
basic purpose of the commerce clause (the United States should be a single com-
mercial unit), can be viewed as giving fishermen a right to take their catch throughout
the navigable waters of the nation, subject to the regulations designed to promote safety
and conservation but free from regulations designed to promote parochial interests.
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legal strictures can be described in terms of cause and effect. The laws
which, in effect, mandate public oyster grounds created the basic eco-
nomic problem - exploitation. But the laws which were subsequently
enacted, nominally to prevent this exploitation, created a problem of
perhaps equal magnitude - a patchwork which mandates ineffici-
encies and protects parochial interests without significantly protecting
the physical yield of the fishery.
Fundamental to improved management of ,the oyster fishery is
liberalization in the techniques through which individuals can obtain
private rights in oyster beds. A legislative mandate that all oyster
bottom be divided among private parcels surely would increase the
total economic yield of the fishery and the profits of those holding
exclusive rights to such parcels and would decrease the cost of oysters
to the consumer. It would also dispense with the need for laws re-
stricting gear, size of oyster, and length of season. But change to a com-
pletely private oyster fishery would not resolve all of the problems.
Oyster beds would still be vulnerable to pollution and siltation. More-
over, the advantages of a private oyster fishery relate only to eco-
nomic efficiency. There are other societal values. The capital and
innovation which would follow change to a private oyster industry
would almost certainly force the traditional oysterman out of business.
With him would disappear most of the skipjacks, the classic bay
vessels. Hence, the change would result in both short run economic
dislocation in tidewater areas and the eventual destruction of the pic-
turesque traditional oyster trade. In addition, if changes in the law
merely took the form of permitting extensive private leasing of bot-
tom, they might create what will prove to be a new set of anachron-
isms. For example, in Japan oyster production has been dramatically
increased through the use of a raft culture in which oysters grow not
on the bottom but on ropes suspended from rafts thereby both taking
maximum advantage of available water, oxygen and food, and avoid-
ing predators.' 54 Although there is no guarantee that a raft culture
would prove feasible in Chesapeake Bay, its use elsewhere illustrates the
disadvantage of being in the statutory lock-step of any particular
oyster-taking technology.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is submitted that drastic surgery
is indicated - the detailed provisions found in Maryland's "oyster
code" which restrict entry and control depletion should be repealed.
In their stead the Fish and Wildlife Administration should be dele-
gated broad authority to manage the oyster fishery. A switch from
detail to delegation has a variety of advantages. Generally, it would
give the Administration the range of choice necessary for effective
management, free from the fetters of anachronistic laws and the cum-
bersomeness of the legislative process. Specifically, it would permit
the Administration to determine the preferred mix between public and
private oyster grounds. While it is certainly envisioned that the De-
partment would take advantage of the economic efficiencies implicit
in restricting entry to the fishery, the Administration could ease the
154. See The Potomac Newsletter, Dec. 30, 1968, at 1-5.
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transition for present oystermen, could consider impositions of limi-
tations on entry other than through leases or outright transfers to
private parties, and might preserve some portions of the oyster bot-
tom as a public ground to serve as a functioning oyster museum.
The Administration would have the authority to negotiate mutually
advantageous trade-offs with its counterpart in Virginia: Maryland
could exchange a portion of its productive bottom for access to Vir-
ginia's superior supply of seed oysters. It would also provide a
mechanism through which existing laws could be rid of their per-
vasive parochialism but, coincidentally, could permit fair representa-
tion of the interests of watermen through notice, hearing and appeal
provisions. Most importantly, the Department would have the au-
thority to respond to changing circumstance, be it pestilence or raft
culture.
